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 Abstract 
An important strand in contemporary political theory argues that democratic methods of 
political decision-making should be extended to the global level. But are people’s fundamental 
views on public policy issue too diverse across the world for democracy? We examine 
systematically the empirical basis of two related concerns: that global democratic decision-
making would leave more people dissatisfied with the outcome of decisions than keeping 
democratic decision-making within national settings, and that it would increase the risk of 
persistent minorities, that is, groups who are systematically outvoted on most policy issues they 
care about. Using opinion polls covering 86 percent of the world population, we compare the 
distribution of policy values within countries to the distribution of policy values in the world 
as a whole. We find that the amount of dissatisfaction with policy and the risk of persistent 
minorities would not increase in a global democratic polity compared to individual states. 
 
Keywords 
Global democracy – Political values – Diversity – Persistent minorities – Policy satisfaction 
 
Data and supplementary material 
Data necessary to reproduce the results in the article are available in the JOP Dataverse 
(https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataverse/jop). 
  
Over the past decades, deepening global interdependence in economic, environmental, social 
and other affairs, along with concomitant reactions against various forms of international 
integration, has provided renewed impetus to age-old debates in political thought on the 
appropriate spatial scale of governance and democracy (Borowiak 2007). The effective 
provision of global collective goods and the protection of human rights and fundamental 
interests is often said to require deeper forms of cross-border political integration, stronger 
intergovernmental institutions, and perhaps even some kind of global government (Cabrera 
2010, Zürn 2016). Scholars supporting the transfer of authority to global institutions generally 
also argue that such institutions ought to make decisions in accordance with democratic 
principles. Cosmopolitan democrats maintain that the best way to preserve democracy under 
conditions of globalization is to extend it beyond states, for instance by creating a global 
parliamentary assembly (Archibugi 2008, Falk and Strauss 2001, Held 1995). Some 
cosmopolitan theorists go as far as stating that “[e]ither democracy is global or it is not 
democracy” (Marchetti 2008, 1). While most scholarship on global democracy is concerned 
with normative arguments on its desirability, some studies empirically trace the emergence of 
nascent democratic dimensions in existing global governance institutions (Goodin 2010, 
Grigorescu 2015, Macdonald 2012, Payne and Samhat 2004, Tallberg et al. 2013, Zürn 2016).  
As the number of scholars arguing in favour of one form or another of global democracy 
has grown, so has the number of their critics. Criticism has come from a variety of quarters, 
such as Realist IR scholars who maintain that state leaders will resist any real transfer of 
authority, theorists of democracy who regard it as possible only among populations that share 
intense and exclusionary bonds of identity, or analysts who consider global decision-making 
too distant from ordinary citizens to enable them to meaningfully participate or be represented 
(Dahl 1999, Miller 2009, Schweller 1999, for a systematic discussion see Valentini 2014). Even 
some defenders of international institutions’ democratic legitimacy argue that such institutions 
should be seen as roughly akin to central banks or judiciaries, effective and normatively 
desirable elements of democratic systems precisely because they are partially insulated from 
direct public input (Keohane, Macedo, and Moravcsik 2009). 
In this article, we focus on a widespread and fundamental—but, we argue, insufficiently 
scrutinized—objection to global democracy: the view that in the world as a whole people’s 
preferences over the content of public policies are simply too diverse for democracy.  
Excessive diversity of what we term policy values—people’s fundamental views on public 
policy questions—may lead to two dangers. First, unless everyone in a polity is in perfect 
agreement, any political regime will leave some citizens more dissatisfied with the content of 
policy decisions than others. To the extent democracies follow majority rule they can minimize 
this concern. More homogenous polities will be more likely to satisfy a larger portion of the 
population. Shifting the site of democratic decision-making from the state level to the 
transnational level risks subjecting populations to majority views distant from their own 
because policy values within states are thought to be relatively homogeneous, at least in 
comparison with the world as a whole. It follows that the emphasis should be on promoting 
and preserving national democracy rather than striving for some form of global democracy. A 
second and related fear is that a shift in the site of democratic decision-making to the 
transnational level would increase the risk of persistent minorities, that is, the existence of 
groups of people who are systematically outvoted not only on individual policies but on most 
policy issues they care about (Christiano 2008). Trying to keep the amount of citizens’ 
dissatisfaction with public policies as low as possible is a worthwhile objective of institutional 
design. It underlies the principle of subsidiarity and much economic literature on federalism 
and decentralization. The problem of persistent minorities may be of even deeper normative 
significance, since for some theorists it potentially undermines the democratic credentials of a 
political system by not treating individuals equally.  
While in this article we treat the potential increase of policy dissatisfaction and especially 
of the risk of persistent minorities as a normative problem, we also note that they have 
important pragmatic implications, e.g. undermining democratic stability. Even in situations 
where majority decisions might be legitimate for democratic theory, they may be rejected as 
illegitimate by the affected minorities themselves, with the resulting risk of alienation and 
rebellion. 
If it were true that the extension of democracy to global decision-making would increase 
policy dissatisfaction and generate persistent minorities, this would constitute a significant 
challenge for its proponents. But is it true? Numerous scholars seem to assume, explicitly or 
implicitly, that it is. For instance, in criticising the proposal for a global parliamentary 
assembly, Joseph Nye remarked that “treating the world as one global constituency implies the 
existence of a political community in which citizens of around 200 states would be willing to 
be continually outvoted by more than a billion Chinese and a billion Indians” (Nye 2002, 17 
emphasis added). The underlying assumption is that, if given the opportunity, people would 
vote along national lines and would do so consistently across the range of issues that may be 
the object of decision. 
We must recognize that we have had little empirical basis to say whether such common 
assumptions are accurate. This article contributes to filling this gap. After introducing the terms 
of the debate, we assess how the extent of policy dissatisfaction and the risk of persistent 
minorities change under an imagined shift in the site of democratic decision-making from the 
national to the global level. We do so by systematically comparing—for the first time, to our 
knowledge—the distribution of policy values within numerous countries of the world to the 
distribution of policy values in the world as a whole. We perform this comparison by defining 
and calculating five measures: heterogeneity of policy values, polarization of policy values, 
crosscuttingness of policy values, overall policy dissatisfaction across issues, and inequality in 
policy dissatisfaction across issues. Each measure contributes to our understanding of whether 
policy dissatisfaction and persistent minorities would increase under global democracy. 
Our empirical analysis draws on two global surveys of political and social attitudes with 
around 50,000 respondents each, which together give us data for 72 unique countries that 
represent 86 percent of the global population. Since the surveys were not designed to answer 
the problem addressed in this article, below we discuss how the survey questions can be used 
for our purposes and, where appropriate, combined to obtain a better fit with our theoretical 
concerns. We find that, on average, the world as a whole is slightly more heterogeneous and 
polarized than individual countries. We also find that, on average, it is slightly more 
crosscutting. In terms of dissatisfaction, we find that a world democracy would have no more 
distance between citizens and the median policy value than the average country would. 
Furthermore, this dissatisfaction would be distributed more widely at the world scale than it 
would be within the average country. The key finding is thus that a world polity would have 
values of heterogeneity, polarization, crosscuttingness, dissatisfaction, and inequality of 
dissatisfaction that are comfortably within the range of those of existing states – in other words, 
the world polity would not be an outlier. The results, robust to a variety of alternative data, 
measurements, and aggregation rules, suggest that, on balance, the risks of dissatisfaction with 
policy and persistent minorities would not increase in a global democratic polity compared to 
individual states. 
In conclusion, we find no significant support for rejecting global democracy in general on 
the ground of preference heterogeneity and persistent minorities. A global democratic polity 
would be like a fairly typical state in this regard. While our argument obviously addresses only 
one of the major debates regarding the democratic legitimacy of supranational institutions, our 
findings should be reassuring for those who believe that there should be more, and more 
democratic, governance at the global level. 
Global democracy: what and why? 
There is a variety of conceptions of what global democracy could and should be (Archibugi, 
Koenig-Archibugi, and Marchetti 2011, Zürn 2016). Some think of replicating at the global 
level the typical institutional features of constitutional democratic states (Cabrera 2004, 
Koenig-Archibugi 2011, Marchetti 2008). Others prefer to decouple democracy from statist 
assumptions and envisage novel forms of democratic control that can match the dispersion of 
power and governance in a pluralistic global system (Little and Macdonald 2013, Scholte 
2014). Pluralistic conceptions of global democracy are often underpinned by theories of 
deliberative democracy (Dryzek, Bächtiger, and Milewicz 2011, Dryzek 2006, Macdonald 
2008). While we cannot settle these differences here, we need to indicate how our approach 
and findings relate to them. We consider our approach and findings directly relevant for any 
conception of global democracy that envisages some role for the aggregation of global citizen 
preferences, even when the moment of aggregation is intended to come at the end of sustained 
and comprehensive deliberative processes (Fishkin 2011, 85-88). Aggregation is a feature not 
just of statist models, but also approaches such as the global stakeholder democracy advocated 
by Terry Macdonald, who emphasizes deliberative procedures but concedes that they have to 
be complemented by aggregative procedures when deliberative consensus cannot be reached 
(Macdonald 2008, 158-162). Moreover, finding that the world as a whole is not abnormally 
diverse even with regard to policy preferences as they are should be heartening also for 
deliberative democrats who hope that deliberative convergence can be fostered by creating 
appropriate transnational fora.   
Generally speaking, supporters of global democracy advance two kinds of justification for 
it, which mirror the main justifications offered for democracy in general. Following the 
literature, we call them “intrinsic” and “instrumental” respectively (Cabrera 2014, Caney 2006, 
Christiano 2006). The intrinsic justification is based on the principle that individuals should be 
entitled to participate, on equal terms, in important decisions that affect their lives (Gould 2004, 
Held 1995). Several authors note that global governance institutions create legal orders meant 
to address common problems and realizing shared values. While these authors regard the 
strengthening of global rule-making as an appropriate response to material and moral 
interdependence, they argue that individuals, being the ultimate subject to global rules, should 
have an equal opportunity to influence the content of those rules and hold accountable the 
power-wielders in charge of their application. The requirement is particularly strong when the 
power-wielders employ coercion (Abizadeh 2012, Erman 2016, Valentini 2014). For various 
reasons, the democratic principle that those subject to a law should also be its authors is not 
well served by the traditional doctrine of state consent and therefore, ideally, global democratic 
institutions and procedures are required to legitimize international law (Buchanan 2004, 314-
27). Other authors support a more expansive interpretation of participatory entitlements in 
decision-making: such entitlements are owed not only to those who are subject to (coercively 
enforced) regulations, but to all those whose interests are significantly affected by the decisions 
(Goodin 2007). From this perspective, global democratic mechanisms are needed to control 
not only multilateral law-making but also unilateral policies of powerful states (Koenig-
Archibugi 2012). 
While such intrinsic arguments for global democracy stress “input legitimacy,” instrumental 
justifications for it focus on the output of decision-making systems. From this perspective, 
global democratic procedures are seen as the most effective institutional framework for the 
realization of global justice and/or the protection of human rights, such as life, bodily integrity 
and basic economic opportunities (Cabrera 2014, Caney 2006). Also this strand of argument 
builds on a line of reasoning that is often heard in the context of national democracies: the 
protection of people’s fundamental rights and interests is greatly enhanced if they have a voice 
in political decision-making, alongside other mechanisms such as fair access to impartial courts 
that safeguard the rule of law (Mill 1861). Global democratic institutions are desirable, the 
argument goes, because they would provide people with means to advance their core interests 
that would be unavailable in a world of sovereign states. 
Assessing the merits of the intrinsic and instrumental justifications of global democracy falls 
outside the scope of this article, but for our purposes it suffices that an increasing number of 
political theorists argues that circumscribing the scope of democratic politics to nation-states 
cannot be justified on normative grounds. The remainder of this article examines two important 
concerns raised by this argument.   
The problems of diversity and persistent minorities  
The idea of global democracy endorsed above entails not only the existence of mechanisms 
aimed at reducing political inequality among people around the world but also the expectation 
that, when extensive and inclusive deliberative processes are unable to generate consensus, 
policy decisions should reflect the preferences of the largest number. This expectation holds 
even though all known blueprints for global democracy contain devices for protecting the 
interests of minorities, notably the judicial review of legislative and executive decisions by a 
constitutional court, a federal distribution of authority across governance levels, and sometimes 
“consociational” arrangements. Here we do not examine how the inclusion of majoritarian 
elements has been justified by its supporters (see Marchetti 2008, 64-5). Instead, in this section 
we will show how those majoritarian elements have prompted some authors to question the 
normative desirability of global democracy.  
We consider two reasons why introducing democratic-majoritarian procedures at the global 
level may be normatively undesirable: the first reason is that such a move would fail to respect 
and accommodate the legitimate diversity of policy values among the people of the world, 
which is better served by insulating national democracies from illegitimate outside 
interference; the second reason is that the global diversity of policy values is distributed in such 
a way that democratic-majoritarian procedures at the global level would generate a serious 
problem of persistent minorities. To be sure, there are other reasons why global democracy 
may be seen as undesirable, such as the obstacles to deliberation in a linguistically and 
culturally fragmented world, low levels of trust, or absence of consistent collective preferences 
and sufficient levels of “meta-agreement” (as opposed to substantive agreement) among the 
world’s population (Kymlicka 2001, List and Koenig-Archibugi 2010, Miller 2009, 2010, Song 
2012, see the comprehensive discussion by Valentini 2014). But here we consider only the two 
lines of argument sketched above, which we now examine more closely. 
At the root of much criticism of global democracy is the view that, as Andrew Hurrell (2007, 
47) summarizes a central aspect of the pluralist interpretation of global politics, “diversity is a 
fundamental feature of humanity and that the clash of moral, national, and religious loyalties 
is not the result of ignorance of irrationality but rather reflects the plurality of values by which 
all political arrangements and notions of the good life are to be judged.” Robert Jackson (2000, 
178-9) distinguishes two ways in which the current world order is pluralist: it displays 
jurisdictional pluralism, i.e. the recognition of the equal sovereignty and territorial integrity of 
states; and it displays value pluralism, i.e. a strong diversity of values held by people in 
different states. “There is almost unlimited heterogeneity in the history, politics, ideology, 
religion, language, ethnicity, culture, customs, traditions, of the member states of global 
international society” (Jackson 2000, 403). In Jackson’s account, the key function and 
achievement of jurisdictional pluralism is the protection of value pluralism. “People want to do 
their own thing in their own way in their own place” and thus “the most important thing is to 
have a local sovereign jurisdiction within which different groups of people can endeavour to 
build their own political life according to their own enlightenment and free of foreign 
interference” (Jackson 2000, 403-4). Pluralists conclude that, “[i]f diversity and value conflicts 
are such important features of international life, then we should seek to organize global politics 
in such a way as to give groups scope for collective self-government and cultural autonomy in 
their own affairs and to reduce the degree to which they will clash over how the world should 
be ordered” (Hurrell 2007, 47). 
Authors who stress the role of national sovereignty in protecting the pursuit of a diverse 
range of values do not necessarily have the same views on why such diversity deserves to be 
protected. Martha Nussbaum (2006, 314) notes that “[t]o protect national sovereignty in a 
world of pluralism is an important part of protecting human freedom.” In David Miller’s 
analysis of where the boundaries of demoi should be drawn, the importance attached to value 
diversity derives from an approach to democratic theory that he labels “radical democracy.” 
From this perspective, “[d]emocracy is a system in which people come together to decide 
matters of common concern on the basis of equality, and the aim is to reach decisions that 
everyone can identify with, that is, can see as in some sense their decision” (Miller 2009, 205-
6). Miller argues that a group must possess several qualities in order to be able to function as a 
demos in this way, notably sympathetic identification, interpersonal trust, stable relationships, 
and underlying agreement on ethical principles. In this article we focus on the latter quality. 
Miller maintains that agreement on ethical principles is weaker beyond nation-states than 
within them, and as a consequence “radical” democrats generally do not find it desirable to 
expand the demos transnationally, especially when there are alternative ways of dealing with 
the detrimental external effects of the decisions of national democracies (see also Miller 2010, 
145-6).  From a different perspective, Kukathas (2006, 20) objects to the establishments of 
global political institutions by, amongst other things, positing that “the likelihood of agreement 
on justice diminishes with the increasing size of the polity”. 
Significantly, these authors tend to assume a high correspondence between—and perhaps 
even tend to conflate—people’s views on public policy, their broader cultural values and 
orientations, and their membership in societies delimited by state boundaries. Crucially for our 
purposes, these arguments do not simply stress that the world population is diverse with regard 
to policy values and preferences, but they maintain that patterns of diversity and commonality 
track the division of the world into states. Simply put, they contrast relatively homogeneous 
state citizenries with a relatively heterogeneous world population.  
As we noted above, there is a second line of argument that leads from the distribution of 
policy preferences in the world to a rejection of global democracy. This argument has been 
developed mainly by Thomas Christiano, who expects that global democracy would greatly 
exacerbate the problem of persistent minorities compared to national democracies. A persistent 
minority consists of members of a population who are systematically outvoted across all policy 
issues, rather than being sometimes on the winning side and sometimes on the losing side. 
Christiano distinguishes this problem from the problem of tyranny of the majority, which 
results from a majority knowingly exploiting and violating the basic rights of minorities. 
Christiano (2008) and other authors (Barry 1979, Cabrera 2014, Dworkin 1987, Guinier 1994, 
Saunders 2010) argue that the existence of persistent minorities weakens the legitimacy of 
democracy even if the majority decision does not violate basic rights. The existence of a group 
that almost never gets the policies that it wants is normatively problematic, Christiano argues, 
because it clashes with several important features of a just democratic process: 
“Clearly, if a group never or almost never has its way in the process of collective 
decision-making then it will not be able to provide a corrective to the cognitive bias of 
the majority in making the laws. They will not be able to make the larger world it lives 
in a home for themselves. And since other citizens will experience no need to listen to 
their ideas about justice and well-being, they will not learn much from the democratic 
process. Finally, since they can see that these interests are being neglected by the 
democratic process, they will have reason to think that they are not being treated as 
equals by the society at large. So they will not have their equal status recognized and 
affirmed.” (Christiano 2008, 296) 
Christiano posits that the problem of persistent minorities would be more severe in a global 
democracy than in national democracies. “This is a significant problem in modern states as 
they are. But it would appear to be an even greater problem in global and transnational 
institutions if they were fully democratized. The larger the constituency, the larger the chances 
are that particular minorities would simply get lost in the democratic decision-making” 
(Christiano 2012, 76). Cabrera (2014, 231) agrees that the problem of persistent minorities 
“could again be magnified with a global extension of participatory institutions,” but thinks that 
this problem is soluble with the appropriate approach to defining the boundaries of the demos.   
This discussion suggests that the desirability of global democracy may ultimately depend on a 
trade-off between desiderata.1 As we saw in the previous section, global democracy may bring 
benefits of an intrinsic nature (it gives people an equal say over decisions that affect or coerce 
them even when they originate beyond state borders) and/or an instrumental nature (it helps 
protect basic rights). On the other hand, in this section we considered two potential costs of 
introducing global democracy: individuals might find their policy preferences overridden more 
often, and overridden across more issues. As Dahl (1994, 29) remarked, “judgments about 
trade-offs are no easy matter”, and we make no attempt at providing a conclusive judgement 
here. But it is important to note that both the diversity and the persistent minority arguments 
make specific empirical assumptions. The former assumes that policy values are significantly 
more diverse at the global than at the national level, and the latter assumes that persistent 
                                                 
1 Dahl (1994) described the development of supranational authority in terms of a trade-off between 
“system effectiveness” and “citizen participation”. We endorse the idea of a trade-off, but conceptualize 
the terms differently. 
minorities are more likely at the global than at the national level. How accurate are these 
empirical assumptions? The remainder of this article tackles this question. 
Assessing the empirical assumptions: measures 
Empirically assessing the view that policy value diversity and the likelihood of persistent 
minorities are significantly higher at the global level than within existing states presents 
considerable challenges. First, we need to know what the policy values of individuals around 
the world are. Second, we need to know which distributions of policy values across individuals 
are likely to leave more people dissatisfied with the outcome of collective decisions and to 
generate more inequality in how policy dissatisfaction is distributed. This and the next section 
outline our strategy for tackling these challenges. Since the second challenge sets some 
constraints on how we can approach the first one, we address it first. The question of the 
relevant data is then discussed in the next section.  
Our task is to gauge the extent to which individuals will be left dissatisfied with the outcome 
of majoritarian decisions on policies, and the likelihood that persistent minorities will emerge. 
Note that we understand “persistent” to mean being outvoted across a spectrum of issues (e.g., 
economic, cultural, environmental) rather than across time - although presumably issues would 
alternate on the agenda and therefore the absence of persistent minorities is equivalent in 
practice to taking turns in winning and losing over time. 
To pursue this task, we adopt or introduce five different measures that apply to a population 
and that, by themselves or in combination, provide useful information for these purposes. These 
are: (1) heterogeneity, which refers to the extent to which the members of the population are 
evenly divided between all possible views on a policy value (e.g. between strong support, 
moderate support, moderate opposition and strong opposition to the “free market”); (2) 
polarization, which captures the extent to which views on a policy value cluster at opposite 
ends of a given dimension (e.g. strong support for and strong opposition to traditionalist family 
policies); (3) crosscuttingness, which captures the extent to which views on one policy value 
(e.g. free market) are correlated with views on a different policy value (e.g. traditional morality) 
in a population; (4) overall policy dissatisfaction in a population, which aggregates the distance 
of each individual from a polity’s central (i.e. median) value across policy issues; and finally 
(5) inequality of policy dissatisfaction across all issues among the members of a polity, which 
captures the extent to which dissatisfaction is concentrated in certain parts of the population.  
Our measures of heterogeneity and polarization are adopted from the literature. Cross-
cuttingness has also been used by other scholars to assess the distribution of religious or ethnic 
cleavages in societies, but we take the additional step of applying it to policy values, as we 
have in earlier work on the European Union (Hale and Koenig-Archibugi 2016). To our 
knowledge, this is the first article to measure overall policy dissatisfaction and inequality of 
policy satisfaction both within countries and globally.  
Each measure can in principle be operationalized in various ways. In Web-Appendix 1 we 
discuss how the measures capture the theoretical concepts of interest and note the various 
formulas that we use in this article and, when relevant, compare them with alternative formulas. 
What is relevant here is that each of these measures can help us capture the underlying 
phenomena of interest, i.e. a) how dissatisfied with majority decisions should individuals 
expect to be in different polities, and b) how unequal that dissatisfaction is likely to be. Our 
measures of heterogeneity, polarization, and, most directly, dissatisfaction each provide 
information on the first concept, the extent to which a majority decision will satisfy all 
members of the polity.  Regarding the second, inequality of policy dissatisfaction is a way to 
directly estimate the severity of the persistent minority problem.  
Combining crosscuttingness with heterogeneity or polarization provides a different route to 
that goal. When policy preferences on individual issues are not polarized, democratic 
satisfaction is likely to be widespread even at low levels of crosscuttingness. The more 
preferences on individual issues are polarized, the more high crosscuttingness is necessary to 
ensure that democratic satisfaction is widespread. The problem of highly unequal democratic 
satisfaction and persistent minorities is severe when polarization is high and crosscuttingness 
is low. 
The implications of transferring powers to supranational levels of governance hence raises 
the following question: How do the five measures compare between the national and the global 
levels?  
Assessing the empirical assumptions: data 
The problems of preference dissatisfaction and persistent minorities are here understood in 
relation to the content of public policies, as opposed to other forms of minority exclusion such 
as lack of demographic representativeness of elected politicians. We are therefore interested in 
the “policy values” of individuals. These are distinct from personal values in that policy values 
refer to the content of collectively binding decisions rather than norms of personal conduct. 
Policy values are also distinct from preferences for specific public policies in that they refer to 
the outcomes of political decision-making rather than the means to achieve them.     
Some studies use socio-demographic indicators such as religious affiliation, language, 
ethnicity and income as proxies for the distribution of preferences across a population (Alesina, 
Baqir, and Easterly 1999, Gubler and Selway 2012). While such socio-demographic 
characteristics no doubt influence the formation and distribution of policy values, the 
correlation between the two is far from perfect – we simply cannot assume high homogeneity 
amongst all members of a certain religious, linguistic, socio-economic, or other group (Dion 
and Birchfield 2010, Guillaud 2013, Kriesi 1998). Hence, our empirical strategy aims at 
capturing those values directly through the analysis of opinion polls. 
A key decision concerns the dimensions that structure policy values around the world. 
Recent research on Western countries seems to have reached the conclusion that public opinion 
(as opposed to political parties) is divided along at least two distinct dimensions (Kitschelt 
1994, Kriesi et al. 2008, Lefkofridi, Wagner, and Willmann 2014, Rovny and Marks n.d.). 
First, there is an economic left-right dimension, which concerns issues such as the relationship 
between governments and markets and the redistribution of income and other resources across 
economic strata. Second, there is a cultural dimension that pits libertarian-alternative against 
traditionalist-authoritarian value orientations. While these dimensions are compelling and are 
included in the study, we accept the argument of Rovny and Marks (n.d.) for identifying the 
main dimensions deductively rather than inductively (e.g. via factor analysis). Therefore we 
add a third dimension – the importance of protecting the environment even at the expenses of 
economic growth – because theoretically it seems sufficiently independent from the other two 
dimensions and because of its substantive importance for national and global politics.  
Our goals set significant constraints on the surveys that we can use. First, the surveys need 
to have sufficient coverage, i.e. they need to encompass all countries in the world or, more 
realistically, a substantial number of countries from each region of the world. Second, to 
measure crosscuttingness we need to know how the same individuals responded to questions 
on at least two, and ideally more, distinct policy dimensions. Third, we need questions that 
ensure comparability across diverse national contexts. While some degree of context anchoring 
is inherent in all survey data, questions that explicitly or implicitly lead respondents to use the 
national status quo as baseline (e.g. Do you prefer more or less redistribution?) are less useful 
than questions that do not do so (e.g. Should the government take care of the poor?).  
With these considerations in mind, we rely primarily on the Pew Global Attitudes Survey 
2007, which polled around 1000 individuals in each of 47 countries representing 60 percent of 
the world’s population.2 The relevant questions covering traditionalism, economic values, and 
environment are shown in Table 1. The questions on environmental protection and 
traditionalism are well suited to capture disagreements that may divide people not only within 
their own countries but also across different regions of a hypothetical global polity. The 
environmental Kuznets curve hypothesis expects respondents from richer and poorer regions 
to provide different answers in relation to the trade-off between environmental protection and 
economic growth (Bravo and Marelli 2007). Similarly, disagreements on whether religion 
should be kept separate from government policy or not have both domestic and global 
relevance, as they can affect a range of transnational issues from human rights to security (Toft, 
Philpott, and Shah 2011). Regarding economic values, the advantage of the Pew survey is that 
the relevant questions are phrased in absolute terms rather than relative to an (implicit) baseline. 
However, an extrapolation from the national to the global level is less straightforward for views 
on the appropriate policy response to poverty and inequality, and therefore we address this 
issue at length in a later section of this article.   
 In addition to the Pew survey, we also use the fifth wave of the World Values Survey 
(WVS), which was conducted between 2005 and 2007 and polled nationally representative 
samples of the adult population in each of 90 countries. Because not every question was asked 
in every country in the fifth wave of the WVS, in practice we include only 52 countries from 
that survey, which cover about 70 percent of the world population. Twenty-seven countries 
were included both in the Pew survey and the WVS. The drawback of the WVS is that the three 
                                                 
2 The survey respondents are a representative sample of the adult population of the 47 countries, except 
those in seven countries (Bolivia, Brazil, China, India, Ivory Coast, Pakistan, and Venezuela) where the 
urban population is slightly to moderately overrepresented and one country (South Africa) where the 
respondents are exclusively urban. See Pew Research Center (2007) for full details. 
questions on the economy, and one of the questions on the environment, are phrased in more 
relativist terms than the Pew questions, and hence responses are likely less comparable across 
countries than those in the Pew survey (see Table 1).  Since the questions asked in the Pew 
survey are better suited than the WVS to capture transnational differences, we should have a 
higher confidence in the accuracy of the world’s rank based on the former. However, including 
the WVS results is useful because they provide additional reassurance that the broader finding 
– the world is not an outlier with regard to policy values diversity – is not overly sensitive to 
the wording of survey questions and the exact set of countries surveyed.   
Estimates for what in the following we call the “world” refer either to all the approximately 
47,000 participants in the Pew study or to the 50,000 individuals surveyed for the questions we 
have selected in the WVS fifth wave. Together they cover around 100,000 individuals in 72 
unique countries representing 86 percent of the world population. In the results reported in the 
following section, the responses are weighted proportionally by the population of the 
respondents’ countries, to simulate a simple “one person, one vote” scenario. In a subsequent 
section, we report results based on alternative aggregation methods.  
We do not aggregate questions across the surveys to avoid potential measurement errors. 
Within each survey, we followed Ansolabehere, Rodden, and Snyder (2008) and averaged 
individuals’ responses across questions in the same dimension to reduce the potential bias any 
individual question may introduce (with appropriate adjustments to make sure high and low 
responses were in the same direction across countries, and, in the case of the traditionalism 
measure in the WVS data, to compress two questions with 10 responses categories to five). 
Ansolabehere, Rodden, and Snyder (2008) found averaging across questions to be little 
different empirically from more complex (and less transparent) approaches to combining data 
to capture an underlying dimension (e.g. factor analysis).   
Findings 
Table 2 provides an overview of our findings, showing how a world polity would compare to 
existing countries in relation to the various measures presented above. In relation to each 
measure and policy dimension, the table indicates the place of the world in a ranking where the 
first-ranked country displays the highest level of heterogeneity, polarization, cross-cuttingness, 
overall dissatisfaction, or inequality of dissatisfaction. Recall that higher scores can be 
expected to exacerbate the problems of diversity and persistent minorities, with the exception 
of crosscuttingness, for which higher scores are more beneficial.  Web-Appendix 2 provides 
full results on each measure: the exact scores for each country, the average of countries, and 
the scores for the world as a whole. In the following, we provide an overview of the main 
findings. 
Heterogeneity. According to the Pew data, for all three dimensions the level of heterogeneity 
of the world is near the average level of heterogeneity of all countries. According to the WVS 
data, the world is more heterogeneous than the average country in all dimensions, but, 
strikingly, not much more. In no case is it more heterogeneous than the most heterogeneous 
countries. To take just one salient comparison, according to the WVS, a hypothetical world 
polity would have less disagreement on the traditionalism dimension than the United States.  
Polarization. Our measurement of polarization paints a similar picture. The Pew data show 
the world to be less polarized than the average country in the economy and traditionalism 
dimensions, falling comfortably low in the rankings. It is as polarized as the average country 
in the environment dimension. The WVS data, by contrast, show the world to be more polarized 
than the average country, although several countries – including the United States in the 
traditionalism dimension – are more polarized than the world.  
Crosscuttingness. The measure provides information on how policy values crosscut or 
reinforce each other in the surveyed countries and across all the citizens in our sample as a 
whole. Our three dimensions can combine in three different ways: traditionalism-economy, 
economy-environment, and traditionalism-environment. As with our other measures, a 
hypothetical global democratic polity would fall comfortably within the range of individual 
countries in terms of crosscuttingness. In the Pew data, the world as a whole is more crosscut 
than the average country in the economy-environment and traditionalism-environment 
dimensions, and less than the average country in the economy-traditionalism dimensions. In 
the WVS data, policy values are more crosscutting in the world as a whole than within the 
average country for all dimensions. In particular, the world is more crosscut than the United 
States in all dimensions in both surveys, except with regard to economy-environment using the 
WVS data. 
Figure 1 summarizes the preceding findings graphically. Each subgraph plots the values of 
each country and of the world (World-PR) in relation to the polarization in one dimension 
(horizontal axis) and the crosscuttingness between two dimensions (vertical axis). Recall the 
point made above: the risk of persistent minorities is highest when high polarization is 
combined with low crosscuttingness, a situation that corresponds to the bottom-right area of 
the graphs. The graph shows that the world as a whole is further away from the “danger zone” 
than a significant portion of countries.  
Overall dissatisfaction and inequality of dissatisfaction. Finally, the findings regarding 
dissatisfaction reveal a very similar story. According the Pew data, the world as a whole has 
almost exactly as much dissatisfaction as the average country, falling squarely in the middle of 
the distribution. The WVS data, in turn, show the world as a whole as having slightly less total 
dissatisfaction than the average country. In both datasets, however, the world’s dissatisfaction 
is spread more broadly than in the average country, with the world ranking 16th out of 47 in the 
Pew data and 11th out of 45 in the WVS data. (Full results in Web-Appendix 2). 
Probing assumptions about transnational solidarity 
The empirical strategy employed in this article rests on the assumption that the policy values 
expressed by citizens would not change if the context of democratic decision-making shifted 
from the national level to the global level. This assumption makes sense in the context of our 
thought-experiment—there is no a priori reason to treat a larger polity differently from a 
smaller one—but how closely does it match current reality? As noted above, the assumption 
seems highly plausible for some of the policy values we consider and the survey questions we 
use to capture them – for instance, a supporter of the legalization of homosexuality in her own 
country is unlikely to support a ban across the world, and this is likely to apply to other issues 
pitting personal freedoms vs traditional morality. The validity of the assumption is perhaps less 
straightforward in relation to other issues, and specifically views on poverty and inequality. 
Most importantly, a respondent completely agreeing that “It is the responsibility of the state to 
take care of very poor people who can't take care of themselves” (one of the Pew survey 
questions we use) may have only her poor co-nationals in mind when answering the question, 
and possibly object to the use of public funds to help poor people abroad. Of course, under the 
global polity we posit, everyone in the world would be co-nationals, but we may worry that 
higher levels of cultural diversity, economic disparity, and other factors may systematically 
reduce such sentiments as the size of the polity expands. Taking the analysis one step further, 
we assess this possibility via a further question included in the Pew survey: “Do you think the 
wealthier nations of the world are doing enough or not doing enough to help the poorer nations 
of the world with problems such as economic development, reducing poverty, and improving 
health?”  Two response categories are relevant: “doing enough” and “not doing enough”. This 
survey question complements the economy questions considered above by capturing 
transnational economic solidarity values more directly.  
We find that support for global redistribution is both higher and more widely distributed 
than may be commonly thought. First, the respondents answering that the wealthier nations are 
not doing enough outnumber respondents answering that enough is being done in all 47 
countries except Indonesia. Globally, about three in four respondents support the idea that rich 
countries should do more. Second, contrary to what some perhaps might expect, we find that 
the view that wealthier nations are not doing enough for poorer nations is more widespread in 
wealthier countries than in poorer countries. There is a strong positive correlation (r = 0.59, p 
< 0.01) between the GDP per capita of a country and support for the view that richer countries 
should do more to promote economic development, reducing poverty, and improving health in 
poorer countries.3  
For our purposes, however, the overall level of solidarity is less important than how it may 
affect the distribution of policy values at different levels of aggregation. Given what we know 
about levels of international solidarity, would the distribution of opinions on helping the global 
poor be fundamentally different than the distribution of opinions on government help for the 
poor in national contexts?  We can test this question by weighting individuals’ views over 
economic redistribution by whether or not they express transnational solidarity. Specifically, 
we re-calculate our economic dimension at the global level by recoding all respondents who a) 
completely/mostly agree that the government should take care of the poor (question Q24b on 
the Pew survey) and b) replied that rich countries were already “doing enough” as respondents 
                                                 
3 The correlation reported is between (a) the difference between the percentage responding “not doing 
enough” and the percentage responding “doing enough” and (b) expenditure-side real GDP in 2007 at 
current PPPs divided by population and logged (from Penn World Tables 9.0). The correlation is 
slightly weaker if GDP per capita is not logged (r = 0.32, p < 0.05).  
who mostly/completely disagree that the government should take care of the poor.4 In other 
words, those who support public help for the poor but not transnational solidarity are now 
assumed to only support help for the poor at the national level, and are therefore coded in 
opposite way for our calculations of a global polity. Under this very restrictive assumption, 
does the global polity lead to a highly increased risk of dissatisfaction or permanent minorities?  
Table 3 compares a world polity in which opinions on redistribution are weighted by 
transnational solidarity to one in which they are not. As we would expect, assuming that all 
respondents who do not express support for transnational solidarity would turn against 
redistributive policies at the global scale increases the world polity’s heterogeneity and 
polarization. Significantly, however, the effect is modest, shifting the world from the middle 
of the distribution to the top quartile, still comfortably within the range of countries. The effect 
on crosscuttingness and overall dissatisfaction is instead largely neutral or even slightly 
positive. In sum, even if respondents were to sharply change their policy views on helping the 
poor with a shift to a global polity, the overall distribution of policy values would not be unduly 
prone to the problem of persistent minorities.  
While these results should be considered suggestive rather than conclusive, what we can say 
is that the most relevant available evidence on public opinion does not support the expectation 
that citizens in rich countries would be constantly outvoted by citizens of poor countries over 
                                                 
4 Specifically, 4004 respondents who “strongly agree” with government responsibility for the poor but 
not with more help from rich to poor countries were re-coded as “mostly disagree” with government 
responsibility for the poor, and 2557 respondents who “mostly agree” with government responsibility 
for the poor but not with more help from rich to poor countries were recoded “strongly disagree” with 
government responsibility for the poor. In total 14.5 percent of the observations were changed for the 
new measure. 
issues of transnational redistribution under a regime of global democracy. As with the policy 
dimensions considered earlier, transnational solidarity is a contentious issue, but not more so 
across countries than within them.  
Alternative assumptions on global institutions 
The measures for the “world” reported above are based on the assumption that public policies 
will reflect median policy values and that each individual counts the same, irrespective of the 
size of her country of residence or other factors. However, in principle there are various ways 
in which individual responses can be combined into a global measure, reflecting alternative 
assumptions on how citizen preferences may be represented and aggregated in a global 
decision-making process. This point is important because scholars and activists have proposed 
a variety of institutional designs for global democracy. While some are sympathetic towards 
global majoritarianism, other proponents of global democracy would prefer a combination of 
majoritarian elements with “federal” institutional devices that acknowledge the role played by 
nation-states in structuring people’s interests and identities (see, for instance, Held 1995; 
Archibugi 2008). One such combination is familiar from the U.S. constitution: a bicameral 
system in which one chamber aims for equal representation of individual citizens and the other 
chamber gives equal weight to constituent states in the allocation of representatives to citizens. 
Moreover, some supporters of an elected global assembly advocate an institutional design that 
balances individual and state equality within the same chamber, by implementing degressive 
proportionality in the distribution of assembly seats to constituencies. Specifically, leaders of 
the International Network of a Second UN Assembly and of the Committee for a Democratic 
U.N. have endorsed the square root formula proposed by Lionel Penrose in 1946 (Bummel 
2010, Segall 1990). According to this proposal, “the voting power of each nation in a world 
assembly should be proportional to the square root of the number of people in millions on each 
nation’s voting list” (Penrose 1946, 56). Another proposal for allocating votes is based on a 
formula that gives equal weight to population sizes, the sovereign equality principle, and states’ 
financial contributions to common activities (Schwartzberg 2012). More complex designs are 
conceivable (Colomer 2014).   
This is not the place to assess the merits and drawbacks of different aggregation methods. 
But we are interested in determining how our results change if we make different assumptions 
about how individual views are aggregated at the global level. To do this, we compare measures 
based on four different aggregation principles: (1) the “one person, one vote” world assumed 
in the previous section, where individual survey responses are weighted in direct proportion to 
the population of the respondents’ countries;  (2) a “Penrose” world, where they are weighted 
by the square root of the country’s population; (3) a “censitary” world, where they are weighed 
by the GDP of their country, understood as proxy for financial contributions to providing global 
public goods; and (4) a “sovereign equality” world, where individual survey responses are not 
weighted by population or other factors. We do not compute formulas mixing the four 
principles for reasons of manageability.  
Figure 2 shows graphically the outcomes of this analysis (the exact scores are provided in 
Web-Appendix 3). We find that the worlds reflecting Penrose, censitary and sovereign-equality 
aggregation principles differ only marginally from the one person, one vote world described in 
the previous sections. Most importantly, the global polities based on each of the four 
aggregation principles would all have values of heterogeneity, polarization, crosscuttingness, 
overall dissatisfaction and dissatisfaction inequality within the range of values displayed by 
existing states. In this context, it is interesting to note that we found no statistically significant 
correlation between any of the five measures considered here and country population size.  
Conclusion 
In this article we have probed the empirical assumptions of two important objections to the 
thesis that democracy should be extended to the global level: the fear that global democracy 
would fail to respect and accommodate the legitimate diversity of policy values among the 
people of the world, and the fear that it would undermine its own democratic credentials by 
locking a substantial proportion of its citizens into a status of persistent minority.  
The empirical analysis has revealed that the distribution of policy values across countries is 
not significantly different from the distribution of policy values within countries. In terms of 
heterogeneity and polarization, the world is about as diverse as the average country in most 
respects, and in any case it cannot be described as an outlier. At the same time, policy values 
across countries tend to crosscut one another slightly more than policy values within countries. 
Overall dissatisfaction with the median position is similar in the world as a whole and in the 
average country, and this dissatisfaction is spread somewhat more equally among individuals. 
The most striking finding is how “normal” a hypothetical global polity would be in terms of 
citizen policy values. This is all the more remarkable considering that individual countries 
possess a state apparatus able to promote convergence of policy values through the education 
system or other socialization mechanisms, whereas the world as a whole does not.  While data 
limitations prevented us from conducting longitudinal analyses, researchers interested in the 
topic should be on the look-out for, and ideally generate, new global data that could help 
identify trends over time. 
We noted above that assessing the desirability of global democracy may involve trade-offs. 
Even those of us who are persuaded that strengthening and democratizing global governance 
would help realize important democratic values may be reluctant to endorse the necessary 
reforms if they resulted in citizens having their policy preferences overridden much more often, 
and overridden across more issues. Our findings indicate that this risk is low, and thus offer 
empirical reassurance regarding two important objections to extending democracy to a larger 
scale.  
This article addressed the problems of diversity and persistent minorities as potentially 
limiting the desirability of global (aggregative) democracy from the perspective of normative 
democratic theory. Can our approach tell us something also on whether global democratic 
institutions would enjoy widespread public support, i.e. social legitimacy in an empirical sense? 
Social legitimacy is not simply a matter of policy satisfaction. Global democracy may be 
undermined by factors such as lack of deliberation in a common public sphere due to high 
linguistic diversity and a deficit of trust resulting from the absence of a shared national identity 
(Archibugi 2008, Zürn 2000). We could conjecture that, if global democratic institutions were 
created, their day-to-day operation might help make people more aware of something that 
emerges from our analysis, i.e. that disagreements over policies often cut across borders rather 
than routinely pitting nationally delimited publics against each other. In turn, this awareness 
may dilute the impact of national identities in driving perceptions of the legitimacy of global 
institutions, and perhaps increase trust beyond national borders. But we have to acknowledge 
that these conjectures remain, for the time being, in the realm of speculation.  
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Table 1: Survey questions used to measure policy values 
Dimension Question Response categories Source and 
question 
code 
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m
 
Religion is a matter of personal faith and 
should be kept separate from government 
policy. 
1 completely agree 
2 mostly agree 
3 mostly disagree 
4 completely disagree 
Pew2007 
Q24c 
Our way of life needs to be protected 
against foreign influence   
1 completely agree 
2 mostly agree 
3 mostly disagree 
4 completely disagree 
Pew2007 
Q24d 
How much do you agree or disagree with 
each of the following statement: 
Politicians who do not believe in God are 
unfit for public office. 
1 Agree strongly 
2 Agree 
3 Neither agree or disagree 
4 Disagree 
5 Strongly disagree 
WVS 2005-7 
F102 
How much do you agree or disagree with 
each of the following statement: 
Religious leaders should not influence 
government. 
1 Agree strongly 
2 Agree 
3 Neither agree or disagree 
4 Disagree 
5 Strongly disagree 
WVS 2005-7 
F105 
Please tell me for each of the following 
statements whether you think it can 
always be justified, never be justified, or 
something in between: Homosexuality 
1 Never justifiable 
↑ 
↓ 
10 Always justifiable 
WVS 2005-7 
F118 
Please tell me for each of the following 
statements whether you think it can 
always be justified, never be justified, or 
something in between: Divorce. 
1 Never justifiable 
↑ 
↓ 
10 Always justifiable 
WVS 2005-7 
F121 
E
co
n
o
m
y
 
Most people are better off in a free 
market economy, even though some 
people are rich and some are poor  
1 completely agree 
2 mostly agree 
3 mostly disagree 
4 completely disagree  
Pew2007 
Q19a 
It is the responsibility of the (state or 
government) to take care of very poor 
people who can't take care of themselves. 
1 completely agree 
2 mostly agree 
3 mostly disagree 
4 completely disagree 
Pew2007 
Q24b 
On this card you see a number of 
opposite views on various issues. How 
would you place your views on this 
scale? 
 
1 Incomes should be made more 
equal 
↑ 
↓ 
10 We need larger income 
differences as incentives 
WVS 2005-7 
E035 
On this card you see a number of 
opposite views on various issues. How 
would you place your views on this 
scale? 
1 Private ownership of business 
should be increased 
↑ 
↓ 
10 Government ownership of 
business should be increased 
WVS 2005-7 
E036 
On this card you see a number of 
opposite views on various issues. How 
would you place your views on this 
scale? 
1 People should take more 
responsibility 
↑ 
↓ 
10 The government should take 
more responsibility 
WVS 2005-7 
E037 
E n v i r o n m e n t Protecting the environment should be 1 completely agree Pew2007 
given priority, even if it causes slower 
economic growth and some loss of jobs 
2 mostly agree 
3 mostly disagree 
4 completely disagree  
Q19c 
I would agree to an increase in taxes if 
the extra money were used to prevent 
environmental pollution 
1 Strongly agree 
2 Agree 
3 Disagree 
4 Strongly disagree 
WVS 2005-7 
B002 
The Government should reduce 
environmental pollution, but it should not 
cost me any money 
 
1 Strongly agree 
2 Agree 
3 Disagree 
4 Strongly disagree 
WVS 2005-7 
B003 
T
ra
n
sn
at
io
n
al
 
so
li
d
ar
it
y
 
Do you think the wealthier nations of the 
world are doing enough or not doing 
enough to help the poorer nations of the 
world with problems such as economic 
development, reducing poverty, and 
improving health?   
1 Doing enough 
2 Not doing enough 
 
Pew2007 
Q100 
 Table 2. Rank of the world in relation to heterogeneity, polarization, crosscuttingness, overall dissatisfaction and inequality of dissatisfaction  
 
Measure Dimension(s) Pew Survey WVS 
  Average of countries World Rank of World Average of countries World Rank of World 
Heterogeneity Economy 0.59 0.59 28th of 48 0.82 0.84 9th of 53 
 Traditionalism 0.58 0.59 19th of 48 0.63 0.68 14th of 46 
 Environment 0.65 0.67 18th of 48 0.59 0.62 16th of 53 
Polarization Economy 0.68 0.65 37th of 48 1.68 1.90 11th of 53 
 Traditionalism 0.66 0.63 33rd of 48 0.78 0.91 5th of 46 
 Environment 0.85 0.85 25th of 48 0.69 0.73 17th of 53 
Crosscuttingness Economy-
Traditionalism 
0.73 0.69 31st of 48 0.91 0.96 13th of 46 
 Economy-
Environment 
0.88 0.96 12th of 48 0.90 0.93 28th of 52 
 Environment-
Traditionalism 
0.92 0.99 4th of 48 0.90 0.96 9th of 46 
Overall 
dissatisfaction 
All dimensions 0.94 0.93 30th of 48 0.88 0.88 19th of 46 
Inequality of 
dissatisfaction 
All dimensions 0.19 0.21 16th of 48 0.26 0.30 37th of 46 
Note:  In the WVS data the number of countries for each measure varies slightly because not all questions were asked in all countries.
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Table 3. Comparison of a world polity in which policy values over economy are weighted by 
transnational solidarity and one in which they are not. Pew data; responses proportional to 
population. 
 
 Unweighted Weighted for transnational 
solidarity 
 Value of 
World 
Rank of World Value of 
World 
Rank of 
World 
Heterogeneity economy 0.587 28th 0.624 9th 
Polarization economy 0.65 37th 0.74 6th 
Crosscuttingness economy-
environment 
0.964 12th 0.955 13th 
Crosscuttingness economy-
traditionalism 
0.690 31st 0.727 27th 
Overall dissatisfaction 0.931 30th 0.914 24th 
Inequality of dissatisfaction (SD) 0.211 16th 0.233 13th 
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Figure 1 (a, b, c): Polarization and crosscuttingness of economy, traditionalism and environment for countries and World (World-PR), Pew survey. 
a  b  
c  
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Figure 2 (a, b, c): Polarization and crosscuttingness of economy, traditionalism and environment for World under different aggregation rules, 
Pew survey. 
a  b  
c  
 
Note: World-PR denotes the “one person one vote” 
World; World-SQ denotes the “Penrose” degressive 
proportionality World; World-GDP denotes the censitary 
World; World-IG denotes the “sovereign equality” 
World; dots represent existing countries (country codes 
not shown). 
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1. Construction of the measures used in the paper 
Heterogeneity 
Heterogeneity refers to the extent to which the members of the population are evenly divided 
between all possible views on a policy value (e.g. between strong support, moderate support, 
moderate opposition and strong opposition to the “free market”). To measure the heterogeneity 
of views on individual policy issues, we use the Herfindahl index. Page (2010, 70) notes that 
it is the most common measure of diversity, and is often used to measure the extent of ethnic 
and linguistic fractionalisation, e.g. by Fearon (2003, 208). The Herfindahl index ranges 
between 1/n and 1, where n is the number of observations. To ensure that higher numbers 
reflect higher degrees of heterogeneity, we subtract it from unity. Our measure of heterogeneity 
for each individual question is therefore:  
𝐻 = 1 − ∑ 𝑌𝑘
2
𝑝
𝑘=1
 
where Yk is the proportion of the population giving a certain response to the question, and p is 
the number of responses for the question.  
Because we focus on three general dimensions (traditionalism, economy, and environment), 
for our principal measure of heterogeneity, we aggregate across different questions, and so 
employ a slightly different measure. We employ Lieberson’s 𝐴𝑤, often used for public opinion 
data, which subtracts the Herfindahl measure from unity and allows for the possibility  of 
combining various dimensions. The formula is:  
𝐴𝑤 = 1 − (∑
𝑌𝑘
2
𝑉
𝑝
𝑘=1
) 
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Where Aw is the heterogeneity in population w, Yk is the proportion of the population falling in 
a given category within each of the questions, V is the number of questions, and p represents 
the total number of categories k possible for all the questions (Lieberson 1969, Sullivan 1973). 
Larger values indicate more heterogeneity.  
 
Polarization 
Polarization must capture not only how policy values are spread across a population, but the 
extent to which policy values cluster at opposite ends of a given dimension. As Bartels (2013) 
notes, the term can be confusing because authors apply it to at least four distinct concepts: the 
level of ‘social dissensus’ in a country, an increase in social dissensus, the degree to which 
public preferences correlate with support for certain parties, or an increase in the degree to 
which public preferences correlate with support for certain parties. In our article polarization 
refers to the first of these alternatives. Lindqvist and Östling (2010, 563) provide a helpful 
discussion of alternative ways of measuring polarization, understood in this way.  They 
compare the standard deviation, the measure developed by Esteban and Ray (1994), and a 
simple measure of bipolarization, the minimum of the proportion of respondents that select the 
highest and lowest values, finding significant correlation across these dimensions. The 
dimensions we consider tend to follow relatively normal distributions (see below), with most 
citizens clustered toward the center. Like Lindqvist and Östling, we chiefly employ the 
standard deviation as it is transparent and easily interpreted. 
Figure A1 provides a visual illustration of the meaning of heterogeneity and polarization and 
their difference, by comparing the distribution of policy values on the economic left-right 
dimension in four countries (using the Pew data). Thailand has relatively low heterogeneity 
and low polarization, as most respondents express moderate views. By contrast, both 
heterogeneity and polarization are above average in Romania, since respondents express a 
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wider range of views, including extreme views. Respondents’ view are widely spread in Italy 
as well, but extreme views are less common there than in Romania, which produces a level of 
polarization that is lower than the sample average, despite heterogeneity being above average. 
Jordan illustrates the opposite situation: some views are expressed much more commonly than 
others, which reduces heterogeneity, but they display a bimodal distribution, which contributes 
to raising the level of polarization above the mean of all countries in the sample.         
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Figure A1. Heterogeneity and Polarization of four countries on the economic left-right dimensions (Pew data).   
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Crosscuttingness 
While long discussed in the pluralist literature, the concept’s empirical meaning was first 
developed by Douglas Rae and Michael Taylor (Rae and Taylor 1970). They explain the idea 
as follows:  
If…all those who held a particular religion were also in the same class (and vice-versa) 
so that the two sets of groups…were considered identical, then the two cleavages are 
said to reinforce each other. If, however, some of those who were of a particular religion 
were divided among several social classes, then we say that the two cleavages cross-
cut each other. Cross-cutting, then, is the extent to which individuals who are in the 
same group on one cleavage are in different groups on the other cleavage (Rae and 
Taylor 1970, 82).  
There are two approaches to measuring crosscuttingness. The first approach is to connect 
crosscuttingness between categories to heterogeneity within categories, so that 
crosscuttingness is necessarily lower at higher levels of heterogeneity. This is the approach 
chosen by Rae and Taylor, who render the concept of crosscuttingness mathematically as: 
𝑋𝐶 =  ∑ 𝑝𝑖
2
𝑖
+ ∑ 𝑝𝑗
2 − 2 ∑ 𝑝𝑖𝑗
2
𝑖,𝑗𝑗
 
where ∑ 𝑝𝑖
2
𝑖  is the sum of the proportion of individuals in each category of a dimension with i 
categories, ∑ 𝑝𝑗
2
𝑗  is the sum of the proportion of individuals in each category of a second 
dimension with categories j, and ∑ 𝑝𝑖𝑗
2
𝑖,𝑗  is the sum of the proportion of individuals at all 
possible combinations of the two dimensions, 𝑖 ×  𝑗 . The concept can be rendered as a 
contingency table that assigns observations to dimension one in i columns and dimension two 
in j rows. Crosscuttingness is then just the sum of the proportion in each row plus the sum of 
the proportion in each column, minus twice the sum of the proportion in each cell.  
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The alternative approach is to capture crosscuttingness through measures of statistical 
association, which indicate the extent to which membership in a category on one dimension 
can be predicted from membership in a category on another dimension, irrespective of how 
heterogeneous the dimensions are. This is the approach chosen by Joel Selway (2011), who has 
recently reintroduced the concept of crosscuttingess in the comparative politics literature in 
order to understand the effects of linguistic and ethnic cleavages on civil war. Selway employs 
the standard chi-square test that measures the independence of two variables. To ensure 
comparability across dimensions that may have different numbers of categories, Selway uses 
Kramer’s V, which normalizes the 𝜒2 statistic by the product of the categories of the two 
dimensions under consideration.  
Since we find it useful to keep a clear conceptual distinction between heterogeneity and 
crosscuttingess, we adopt an approach similar to Selway’s. But because we are concerned with 
the crosscuttingness of policy values as ordinal variables, not discrete linguistic or ethnic 
groups, Kramer’s V is not appropriate (Selway 2011, 52). Instead we rely on Goodman and 
Kruskal’s gamma, an ordinal measure of association: 
𝛾 =
𝑃𝑠 − 𝑃𝑑
𝑃𝑠 + 𝑃𝑑
 
where 𝑃𝑠 is the probability that a randomly selected pair of observations will place in the same 
order and 𝑃𝑑 is the probability that a random pair will have a different order (Goodman and 
Kruskal 1954). Gamma varies from [-1, 1], with -1 indicating perfect divergence, 1 indicating 
perfect convergence, and 0 indicating no association. Because we are not concerned with the 
direction of association, just whether the dimensions are crosscutting or reinforcing, we obtain 
our measure of crosscuttingness by subtracting the absolute value of gamma from unity: 
𝑋𝐶 = 1 − |𝛾| 
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Note that gamma is sensitive to the number of categories within each dimension, meaning that 
our measure of crosscuttingness will not be directly comparable across dimensions that have 
different numbers of categories (Rae and Taylor 1970, 84). Happily, working with public 
opinion data allows us to elide this limitation, because we can select questions that have the 
same number of possible responses, allowing crosscuttingness to be compared directly.  
 
Overall dissatisfaction 
We introduce “dissatisfaction” as a measure of the diversity of policy values in a society. It 
measures the distance of all individuals’ policy values from the average individual in each 
policy dimension, averaged across policy dimensions. Because our research question is 
concerned with democracy, we measure each individual’s distance from the median value,5 
which in a perfect voting environment can be expected to be the policy adopted.  
Conceptually, one could imagine dissatisfaction as the total area under a density plot of the 
number of people holding certain policy values on a given dimension. Because in this article 
we employ a simple ordinal scale to measure policy values, mathematically we represent this 
idea as: 
 
𝐷 =  
∑ (∑ ?̂?𝑘 − 𝑥𝑖,𝑘
𝑁
𝑛=1 )
𝑃
𝑘=1
𝑁𝑃
 
                                                 
5 As an alternative, we also calculated the same measure using the mean, and found little 
difference in practice (in almost all the polities in our sample the mean and the median are quite 
close).  
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Where 𝑥𝑖,𝑘 is individual i's policy value on dimension k, ?̂?𝑘 is the median policy value on 
dimension k,  N is the total number of individuals in the society, and P is the total number of 
policy dimensions. 
 
Inequality of dissatisfaction 
We are also interested in how widely dissatisfaction is distributed across a polity. When 
dissatisfaction is highly concentrated, the threat of persistent minorities grows. Many measures 
of dispersion are possible. Here we simply use the standard deviation of our dissatisfaction 
measure for a given polity.   
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2. Complete scores on all measures for all countries and World 
Table A1: Heterogeneity across the globe compared to heterogeneity in individual 
states. Pew data.   
 
Country Economy Traditionalism Environment 
Palestinian Territories 0.61 0.64 0.73 
Argentina 0.64 0.60 0.63 
Bangladesh 0.56 0.56 0.46 
Bolivia 0.62 0.54 0.66 
Brazil 0.57 0.57 0.65 
Bulgaria 0.60 0.55 0.62 
Canada 0.58 0.59 0.66 
Chile 0.60 0.58 0.65 
China 0.52 0.54 0.62 
Czech Republic 0.58 0.57 0.66 
Ethiopia 0.59 0.55 0.65 
France 0.64 0.60 0.73 
Germany 0.58 0.60 0.65 
Ghana 0.62 0.56 0.68 
India 0.60 0.55 0.60 
Indonesia 0.55 0.57 0.70 
Israel 0.57 0.65 0.69 
Italy 0.55 0.54 0.59 
Ivory Coast 0.59 0.59 0.68 
Japan 0.58 0.57 0.64 
Jordan 0.64 0.64 0.68 
Kenya 0.60 0.54 0.64 
South Korea 0.51 0.52 0.59 
Kuwait 0.64 0.67 0.61 
Lebanon 0.59 0.54 0.73 
Malaysia 0.52 0.60 0.66 
Mali 0.62 0.60 0.72 
Mexico 0.55 0.55 0.66 
Morocco 0.57 0.54 0.58 
Nigeria 0.58 0.58 0.75 
Pakistan 0.63 0.58 0.72 
Peru 0.60 0.56 0.70 
Poland 0.55 0.51 0.65 
Senegal 0.58 0.60 0.73 
Slovakia 0.60 0.55 0.65 
South Africa 0.59 0.60 0.71 
Spain 0.50 0.57 0.62 
Sweden 0.60 0.57 0.54 
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Turkey 0.59 0.54 0.61 
Uganda 0.61 0.63 0.52 
Ukraine 0.58 0.55 0.67 
Russia 0.61 0.61 0.66 
Egypt 0.68 0.63 0.69 
Great Britain 0.56 0.59 0.65 
Tanzania 0.63 0.60 0.51 
United States 0.63 0.64 0.70 
Venezuela 0.61 0.55 0.65 
    
Country average 0.59 0.58 0.65 
World 0.59 0.59 0.67 
World’s rank 28/48 19/48 18/48 
 
 
 
Table A2: Heterogeneity across the globe compared to heterogeneity in individual 
states. WVS data.   
Country Economy Traditionalism Environment 
Andorra 0.808 0.559 0.626 
Argentina 0.856 0.717 0.598 
Australia 0.831 0.691 0.654 
Brazil 0.827 0.653 0.596 
Bulgaria 0.854 0.674 0.639 
Burkina Faso 0.810 0.602 0.572 
Canada 0.818 0.699 0.620 
Chile 0.837 0.685 0.610 
China 0.840  0.567 
Colombia 0.848   
Cyprus 0.839 0.687 0.622 
Egypt 0.797  0.558 
Ethiopia 0.805 0.536 0.654 
Finland 0.804 0.689 0.647 
Georgia 0.806 0.487 0.645 
Germany 0.833 0.688 0.619 
Ghana 0.846 0.560 0.647 
Guatemala 0.849 0.639 0.610 
Hong Kong 0.711  0.498 
India 0.844 0.623 0.594 
Indonesia 0.795 0.431 0.497 
Iran 0.837 0.528 0.427 
Italy 0.823 0.669 0.548 
Japan 0.774 0.650 0.652 
Jordan 0.786 0.488 0.582 
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Malaysia 0.741 0.600 0.540 
Mali 0.794 0.654 0.556 
Mexico 0.842 0.694 0.554 
Moldova 0.817 0.612 0.642 
Morocco 0.813  0.548 
New Zealand 0.823 0.686 0.599 
Norway 0.807 0.594 0.717 
Peru 0.816  0.528 
Poland 0.839 0.668 0.636 
Romania 0.863 0.632 0.599 
Rwanda 0.791 0.553 0.580 
Serbia 0.826 0.636 0.466 
Slovenia 0.836 0.701 0.651 
South Africa 0.847 0.648 0.625 
South Korea 0.793 0.608 0.593 
Spain 0.804 0.690 0.523 
Sweden 0.836 0.578 0.569 
Switzerland 0.813  0.668 
Taiwan 0.809 0.620 0.598 
Thailand 0.739 0.546 0.485 
Trinidad and Tobago 0.831 0.604 0.584 
Turkey 0.832 0.594 0.558 
Ukraine 0.831 0.608 0.558 
United States 0.823 0.729 0.618 
Uruguay 0.807 0.693 0.568 
Vietnam 0.847 0.555 0.581 
Zambia 0.830 0.653 0.648 
    
Average country 0.818 0.625 0.590 
World 0.844 0.682 0.623 
World’s rank 9/53 14/46 16/53 
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Table A3: Polarization across the globe compared to polarization in individual 
states. Pew data.  
 Economy Traditionalism Environment 
Palestinian Territories 0.73 0.77 1.01 
Argentina 0.76 0.69 0.81 
Bangladesh 0.61 0.63 0.58 
Bolivia 0.71 0.60 0.83 
Brazil 0.65 0.66 0.88 
Bulgaria 0.67 0.60 0.76 
Canada 0.67 0.68 0.88 
Chile 0.69 0.65 0.83 
China 0.59 0.59 0.74 
Czech Republic 0.69 0.67 0.83 
Ethiopia 0.69 0.62 0.80 
France 0.76 0.71 1.04 
Germany 0.67 0.68 0.83 
Ghana 0.73 0.64 0.93 
India 0.69 0.60 0.88 
Indonesia 0.63 0.64 0.90 
Israel 0.65 0.78 0.88 
Italy 0.61 0.62 0.70 
Ivory Coast 0.68 0.68 0.92 
Japan 0.65 0.66 0.77 
Jordan 0.75 0.75 0.85 
Kenya 0.70 0.60 0.89 
South Korea 0.55 0.54 0.69 
Kuwait 0.75 0.85 0.96 
Lebanon 0.67 0.62 0.99 
Malaysia 0.60 0.69 0.85 
Mali 0.73 0.72 1.04 
Mexico 0.62 0.60 0.83 
Morocco 0.63 0.58 0.68 
Nigeria 0.68 0.67 1.07 
Pakistan 0.73 0.65 1.01 
Peru 0.70 0.63 0.94 
Poland 0.64 0.59 0.79 
Senegal 0.68 0.71 0.98 
Slovakia 0.69 0.67 0.83 
South Africa 0.69 0.69 1.02 
Spain 0.58 0.65 0.75 
Sweden 0.70 0.73 0.75 
Turkey 0.67 0.58 0.73 
Uganda 0.71 0.76 0.74 
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Ukraine 0.70 0.62 0.89 
Russia 0.73 0.70 0.82 
Egypt 0.83 0.75 0.89 
Great Britain 0.65 0.66 0.81 
Tanzania 0.74 0.69 0.79 
United States 0.74 0.76 0.92 
Venezuela 0.70 0.61 0.85 
    
Country average 0.68 0.66 0.85 
World 0.65 0.63 0.85 
World’s rank 37/48 33/48 25/48 
 
 
Table A4: Polarization across the globe compared to polarization in individual 
states. WVS data.  
 
Country Economy Traditionalism Environment 
Andorra 1.50 0.72 0.72 
Argentina 2.07 0.96 0.69 
Australia 1.73 0.89 0.78 
Brazil 1.72 0.81 0.68 
Bulgaria 1.98 0.84 0.76 
Burkina Faso 1.59 0.72 0.68 
Canada 1.58 0.92 0.72 
Chile 1.82 0.88 0.70 
China 1.83  0.64 
Colombia 2.07   
Cyprus 1.87 0.88 0.73 
Egypt 1.50  0.67 
Ethiopia 1.66 0.69 0.79 
Finland 1.52 0.89 0.77 
Georgia 1.46 0.59 0.76 
Germany 1.70 0.88 0.77 
Ghana 1.96 0.68 0.78 
Guatemala 1.98 0.77 0.70 
Hong Kong 1.11  0.55 
India 2.11 0.78 0.70 
Indonesia 1.53 0.56 0.57 
Iran 1.79 0.65 0.53 
Italy 1.68 0.85 0.61 
Japan 1.36 0.79 0.78 
Jordan 1.71 0.56 0.70 
Malaysia 1.19 0.71 0.61 
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Mali 1.59 0.81 0.65 
Mexico 2.04 0.89 0.63 
Moldova 1.56 0.72 0.74 
Morocco 1.54  0.61 
New Zealand 1.62 0.89 0.70 
Norway 1.51 0.78 0.95 
Peru 1.69  0.60 
Poland 1.80 0.84 0.75 
Romania 2.10 0.77 0.71 
Rwanda 1.43 0.62 0.68 
Serbia 1.74 0.78 0.57 
Slovenia 1.80 0.90 0.78 
South Africa 1.91 0.78 0.73 
South Korea 1.41 0.72 0.67 
Spain 1.59 0.92 0.57 
Sweden 1.72 0.74 0.67 
Switzerland 1.56  0.82 
Taiwan 1.52 0.74 0.69 
Thailand 1.20 0.59 0.55 
Trinidad and Tobago 1.90 0.72 0.66 
Turkey 1.75 0.72 0.69 
Ukraine 1.68 0.72 0.61 
United States 1.58 1.02 0.72 
Uruguay 1.57 0.88 0.64 
Vietnam 1.91 0.61 0.65 
Zambia 1.78 0.81 0.77 
    
Average country 1.68 0.78 0.69 
World 1.90 0.91 0.73 
World’s rank 11/53 5/46 17/53 
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Table A5: Crosscuttingness across the globe and in individual states, Pew data 
 Traditionalism-
economy 
Economy-
environment 
Traditionalism-
environment 
Palestinian Territories 0.790 0.878 0.936 
Argentina 0.770 0.776 0.949 
Bangladesh 0.637 0.998 0.979 
Bolivia 0.666 0.969 0.812 
Brazil 0.740 0.905 0.948 
Bulgaria 0.778 0.967 0.978 
Canada 0.732 0.847 0.873 
Chile 0.574 0.890 0.965 
China 0.598 0.907 0.964 
Czech Republic 0.864 0.894 0.993 
Ethiopia 0.745 0.751 0.947 
France 0.882 0.965 0.903 
Germany 0.826 0.970 0.877 
Ghana 0.633 0.828 0.897 
India 0.712 0.888 0.986 
Indonesia 0.880 0.809 0.969 
Israel 0.771 0.941 0.881 
Italy 0.609 0.883 0.898 
Ivory Coast 0.792 0.984 0.927 
Japan 0.652 0.919 0.931 
Jordan 0.930 0.956 0.867 
Kenya 0.795 0.594 0.982 
South Korea 0.428 0.902 0.975 
Kuwait 0.894 0.997 0.996 
Lebanon 0.671 0.765 0.813 
Malaysia 0.755 0.992 0.765 
Mali 0.748 0.875 0.858 
Mexico 0.642 0.905 0.801 
Morocco 0.773 0.697 0.979 
Nigeria 0.630 0.662 0.915 
Pakistan 0.804 0.834 0.970 
Peru 0.838 0.940 0.964 
Poland 0.593 0.948 0.970 
Senegal 0.827 0.946 0.951 
Slovakia 0.846 0.872 0.911 
South Africa 0.722 0.884 0.984 
Spain 0.590 0.996 0.958 
Sweden 0.751 0.722 0.736 
Turkey 0.691 0.767 0.984 
Uganda 0.686 0.873 0.864 
Ukraine 0.533 0.985 0.981 
Russia 0.716 0.943 0.933 
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Egypt 0.897 0.803 0.924 
Great Britain 0.731 0.904 0.838 
Tanzania 0.839 0.991 0.973 
United States 0.658 0.758 0.709 
Venezuela 0.632 0.930 0.910 
    
Country average 0.729 0.881 0.917 
World 0.690 0.964 0.985 
World’s rank 31/48 12/48 4/48 
 
 
 
Table A6: Crosscuttingness across the globe and in individual states, WVS data 
Country Traditionalism- 
economy 
Economy- 
environment 
Traditionalism- 
environment 
Andorra 0.918 0.933 0.918 
Argentina 0.941 0.942 0.980 
Australia 0.938 1.000 0.781 
Brazil 0.941 0.928 0.960 
Bulgaria 0.785 0.719 0.879 
Burkina Faso 0.852 0.932 0.914 
Canada 0.950 0.976 0.810 
Chile 0.999 0.914 0.915 
China 1.000 0.888 1.000 
Cyprus 0.798 0.969 0.895 
Egypt  0.946  
Ethiopia 0.834 0.990 0.639 
Finland 0.998 0.975 0.848 
Georgia 0.955 0.953 0.895 
Germany 0.986 0.803 0.905 
Ghana 0.983 0.895 0.891 
Guatemala 0.929 0.994 0.915 
Hong Kong  0.993  
India 0.906 0.961 0.858 
Indonesia 0.888 0.853 0.960 
Iran 0.866 0.853 0.935 
Italy 0.965 0.917 0.945 
Japan 0.931 0.808 0.928 
Jordan 0.990 0.957 0.829 
Malaysia 0.971 0.946 0.828 
Mali 0.943 0.948 0.940 
Mexico 0.886 0.989 0.938 
Moldova 0.890 0.909 0.978 
Morocco  0.851  
New Zealand 0.965 0.870 0.820 
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Norway 0.877 0.956 0.915 
Peru  0.814  
Poland 0.804 0.755 0.934 
Romania 0.753 0.662 0.891 
Rwanda 0.930 0.904 0.897 
Serbia 0.877 0.934 0.976 
Slovenia 0.827 0.808 0.757 
South Africa 0.903 0.892 0.939 
South Korea 0.950 0.876 0.973 
Spain 0.883 0.960 0.960 
Sweden 0.942 0.730 0.829 
Switzerland 1.000 0.949 1.000 
Taiwan 0.826 0.773 0.731 
Thailand 0.870 0.973 0.920 
Trinidad and Tobago 0.972 0.947 0.929 
Turkey 0.965 0.988 0.975 
Ukraine 0.880 0.926 0.997 
United States 0.853 1.000 0.948 
Uruguay 0.928 0.929 0.925 
Viet Nam 0.858 0.887 0.779 
Zambia 0.881 0.818 0.909 
    
Average country 0.910 0.904 0.900 
World 0.963 0.926 0.961 
World’s rank 13/46 28/52 9/46 
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Table A7: Dissatisfaction across the globe and in individual states, Pew data 
Country Overall dissatisfaction Inequality of dissatisfaction 
Palestinian Territories 0.971 0.251 
Argentina 0.907 0.169 
Bangladesh 0.956 0.197 
Bolivia 0.911 0.162 
Brazil 0.902 0.156 
Bulgaria 0.888 0.127 
Canada 0.911 0.187 
Chile 0.894 0.157 
China 0.900 0.146 
Czech Republic 0.902 0.160 
Ethiopia 0.888 0.131 
France 0.964 0.230 
Germany 0.901 0.152 
Ghana 0.966 0.243 
India 1.007 0.280 
Indonesia 0.934 0.193 
Israel 0.933 0.204 
Italy 0.890 0.123 
Ivory Coast 0.907 0.180 
Japan 0.931 0.185 
Jordan 0.959 0.220 
Kenya 0.907 0.184 
South Korea 0.892 0.112 
Kuwait 1.082 0.354 
Lebanon 0.942 0.225 
Malaysia 0.921 0.170 
Mali 0.961 0.234 
Mexico 0.912 0.161 
Morocco 0.881 0.130 
Nigeria 0.969 0.236 
Pakistan 0.934 0.200 
Peru 0.915 0.190 
Poland 0.896 0.139 
Senegal 0.932 0.202 
Slovakia 0.913 0.177 
South Africa 0.976 0.240 
Spain 0.887 0.114 
Sweden 1.058 0.320 
Turkey 0.893 0.135 
Uganda 1.009 0.278 
Ukraine 0.895 0.161 
Russia 0.912 0.183 
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Egypt 0.980 0.241 
Great Britain 0.899 0.146 
Tanzania 1.003 0.271 
United States 0.945 0.233 
Venezuela 0.904 0.175 
   
Country average 0.933 0.193 
World 0.931 0.211 
World rank 30/48 16/48 
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Table A8: Dissatisfaction across the globe and in individual states, WVS data 
Country Overall dissatisfaction Inequality of dissatisfaction 
Andorra 0.90 0.27 
Argentina 0.94 0.30 
Australia 0.90 0.29 
Brazil 0.85 0.25 
Bulgaria 0.93 0.31 
Burkina Faso 0.84 0.23 
Canada 0.90 0.28 
Chile 0.93 0.30 
Cyprus 0.91 0.29 
Ethiopia 0.93 0.31 
Finland 0.89 0.26 
Georgia 0.84 0.19 
Germany 0.86 0.25 
Ghana 0.92 0.28 
Guatemala 0.89 0.27 
India 0.93 0.32 
Indonesia 0.85 0.21 
Iran 0.90 0.23 
Iraq 0.89 0.26 
Japan 0.70 0.29 
Jordan 0.84 0.23 
Malaysia 0.86 0.22 
Mali 0.84 0.23 
Mexico 0.91 0.31 
Moldova 0.83 0.20 
Netherlands 0.89 0.26 
Norway 1.02 0.38 
Poland 0.89 0.27 
Romania 0.92 0.29 
Rwanda 0.85 0.21 
Serbia 0.89 0.27 
Slovenia 0.89 0.29 
South Africa 0.89 0.27 
South Korea 0.83 0.19 
Spain 0.87 0.25 
Sweden 0.94 0.31 
Taiwan 0.86 0.22 
Thailand 0.83 0.18 
Trinidad and Tobago 0.88 0.26 
Turkey 0.91 0.30 
Ukraine 0.83 0.20 
United States 0.92 0.28 
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Uruguay 0.86 0.25 
Viet Nam 0.88 0.25 
Zambia 0.87 0.26 
   
Country average 0.88 0.26 
World 0.88 0.30 
World’s rank 19/46 37/46 
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3. The World under four aggregation rules 
Table A10. Scores of World for four aggregation rules compared to average 
country. Pew survey.    
Measure Proportional 
representation 
(one person 
one vote) 
Sovereign 
equality 
Penrose 
(degressive 
proportionality) 
Censitary 
(votes 
weighted 
by GDP) 
Average 
country 
H
et
er
o
g
en
ei
ty
 Economy 
 
0.587 
 
0.599 
 
0.596 
 
0.588 
 
0.590 
 
Traditionalism 
 
0.589 
 
0.604 
 
0.603 
 
0.596 
 
0.578 
 
Environment 
 
0.666 
 
0.681 
 
0.676 
 
0.678 
 
0.650  
 
P
o
la
ri
za
ti
o
n
 
  
Economy 
 
0.65 
 
0.69 
 
0.67 
 
0.67 
 
0.68 
 
Traditionalism 
 
0.63 
 
0.70 
 
0.67 
 
0.68 
 
0.66 
 
Environment 
 
0.85 
 
0.90 
 
0.88 
 
0.89 
 
0.85 
 
C
ro
ss
cu
tt
in
g
n
es
s 
Traditionalism-
environment 
 
0.985 
 
0.967 
 
0.998 
 
0.794 
 
0.917 
 
Economy-
environment 
 
0.964 
 
0.928 
 
0.941 
 
0.881 
 
0.881 
 
Traditionalism-
economy 
 
0.690 
 
0.750 
 
0.721 
 
0.895 
 
0.729 
 
Overall dissatisfaction 0.931 
 
0.931 
 
0.923 
 
0.913 
 
0.933 
 
Inequality of 
dissatisfaction (SD) 
0.211 
 
0.211 
 
0.200 
 
0.189 
 
0.193 
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